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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION FROM JOHN
LILBURNE TO OLLIE NORTH
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.*
In the 200th anniversary year of the Constitution, inadequate
attention was paid to the turbulent history and current application
of the fifth amendment privilege that no person "shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ...." This
ecumenical provision has been invoked over the years by such differing groups as the Communists and their fellow travellers and
dupes, Iran-Contra superpatriots, crooked business and government
leaders, and almost anyone else caught up in the tolls of the law.
Yet, even the diversity of those benefitting from the privilege and its
ancient and honorable roots have too often failed, in periods of domestic stress, to persuade judges of its importance. A little history
of this much maligned and often ignored constitutional provision
might be both timely and useful.
Some historians trace the prohibition against self-incrimination
all the way back to Magna Carta. Although largely a struggle between King John and the English barons, Magna Carta contained
this lofty if somewhat vague provision: "No free man shall be taken
or imprisoned or dispossessed . . . except by the legal judgment of
his peers or by the law of the land." But more commonly the privilege against self-incrimination is traced back to the seventeenthcentury Leveller Movement and its hero Freeborn John Lilburne.
Following a trip to Holland in 1637, Lilburne was arrested on
suspicion of importing "factious and scandalous books" into England. When the authorities and the Star Chamber tried to interrogate him, he asserted what he claimed with more certainty than
precedent was the right of a freeborn Englishman not to accuse
himself. Whippings, the pillory, imprisonment, massive fines could
neither force answers from his lips nor silence his eloquence against
"crimination." He finally was vindicated and released from prison
at the direction of the Long Parliament; his role as national hero
was confirmed by a substantial indemnity ordered by the House of
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Lords. As Dean Erwin N. Griswold made clear in his bold and
brilliant tract in the 1950s, "[T]his event seems to have been enough
to establish the privilege against self-incrimination as a part of the
common law ... and [it] came to this continent as a part of the legal
heritage of our early settlers." When the demand for a Bill of
Rights arose with the drafting and ratification of the Constitution
two centuries ago, the privilege against self-incrimination was included in the fifth amendment, thus buttressing the presumption of
innocence and placing the burden of proving guilt upon the government. But the privilege's inclusion in the Constitution was more
tranquil than its life since.
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, like
the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was of course only applicable against the new federal government. Even after the Supreme
Court began interpreting the fourteenth amendment's "due process" clause as incorporating substantial segments of the Bill of
Rights like the first amendment, the privilege against self-incrimination was not given that lofty status. As late as 1937, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, certainly one of the greatest and most liberal
judges in our entire legal history, found the privilege not "so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental. . . . Indeed, today as in the past there are students of
our penal system who look upon the immunity as a mischief ... and
who would limit its scope, or destroy it altogether." I was Justice
Cardozo's law clerk at the time; the only defense I can make fifty
years later is a combination of hero worship and my own plea of
self-incrimination. It was not until 1964 that the privilege became
binding upon the states.
Likely the worst storm to engulf the fifth amendment came in
the wake of World War II with the anti-Communist hysteria that
followed the nation's disillusionment with its Soviet wartime ally.
The House un-American Activities Committee ("HUAC") set its
sights on exposing to public view Communists and their fellow
travellers in all walks of life. One of HUAC's first targets was the
motion picture industry. The Committee subpoenaed ten screenwriters, promptly dubbed the Hollywood 10, who balked at answering questions about Communist affiliations. Recognizing the public
hostility to a plea of self-incrimination, the Hollywood 10 based
their refusal upon the rights of silence and privacy of thought which
they extrapolated from the first amendment. The lower courts,
however, rejected these contentions and the Vinson Supreme Court
refused to review the case.
The jail terms served by John Howard Lawson, Dalton
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Trumbo and their associates would almost certainly have been
avoided by a timely plea of self-incrimination. The same year that
the Supreme Court refused to review the Hollywood lO's unsuccessful reliance upon the first amendment (1950), the Court upheld the
plea of self-incrimination against questioning concerning Communist activities or affiliations when the witness's answers "would have
furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution ...
for violation of (or conspiracy to violate) the Smith Act."
These actions of the Supreme Court forced reliance upon the
fifth rather than the first amendment where a congressional committee witness was unwilling to reveal Communist ideology or affiliations. The consequences extended far beyond the imprisonment of
the Hollywood 10. Communist-hunters, with the late recruit Senator Joseph McCarthy leading the charge (he joined the pack in
1950), labelled those who invoked the privilege "Fifth Amendment
Communists." For at least a large segment of the public, the plea of
self-incrimination turned into an admission of Communist ideology
or even subversion. The congressional investigating committees
wanted little more from the witnesses before them than pleas of the
fifth amendment; even when a witness made clear in executive session or otherwise that he would plead the privilege rather than furnish information, the committee would hold a public session to
expose him as a "Fifth Amendment Communist."
There were, of course, reasons why a witness might plead the
fifth amendment that were both nonincriminating and honorable.
Playwright Lillian Hellman asked me to represent her when she received a subpoena from HUAC in 1952. She told me that she was
quite willing to tell all about her own political affiliations and activities. She hated the idea of pleading the fifth amendment. But she
also said she was unwilling to testify concerning the affiliations and
activities of others, and she did not think she was the kind of person
who could serve a prison sentence. This created a considerable
legal dilemma not only for Miss Hellman, but for many like her
who were willing to testify about themselves but unwilling to "name
names" or invite a jail term.
The reason for her dilemma was a Supreme Court ruling that a
person who tells about, and thus incriminates, herself "waives" the
privilege in various ways, including testifying about others. Thus, if
Miss Hellman testified about herself, she could not invoke the privilege as to others and would be faced with the unacceptable alternatives of naming names or a prison sentence. In this situation, Miss
Hellman wrote HUAC that she had "nothing to hide from your
Committee" and was willing to testify before the Committee "as to
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my own opinions and my own actions .... " Since this would waive
her privilege against self-incrimination (a privilege she legally had),
she asked HUAC to agree not to force her to answer questions
about others. "I cannot and will not," she wrote, "cut my conscience to fit this year's fashions . . . ." The Committee haughtily
rejected the proposal. While Miss Hellman was pleading the fifth
amendment, the press was reading the letter we distributed in the
Committee room. Miss Hellman and I had agreed that victory or
defeat would be measured by whether the headlines the next day
pitched the story on her refusal to name names or her plea of the
fifth amendment. We won!
A much easier client was playwright Arthur Miller, who received his HUAC subpoena four years later, apparently because the
Committee thought a little Marilyn Monroe publicity would not
hurt. (Miller and Monroe were engaged at the time.) Rejecting any
fifth amendment plea, Mr. Miller testified all about his own activities and then bluntly refused to name names, thus inviting the indictment for contempt of Congress which followed in due course.
Arthur Miller had a perfect first amendment case; the Committee asked him all about his past beliefs, expressions, and associations; interrogated him in detail about his plays; and went so far as
to question him repeatedly about his criticisms of HUAC. But the
court of appeals, ducking the first amendment issue, found a technical defect in the Committee's procedures as a reason for acquitting
Mr. Miller. So his truly noble effort to vindicate first amendment
rights in the face of the Hollywood 10 defeat went by the boards.
I participated in one more "fifth amendment" case from the
McCarthy-HUAC period that may be worthy of mention-that of
United Auto Workers organizer John Watkins. Charges of "Fifth
Amendment Communist" were blackening not only the individuals
that they were made against but the organizations in which they
were involved. Walter Reuther, President of the UAW and himself
a champion of civil liberties, felt duty-bound to inform the entire
UAW staff that they could not plead the fifth amendment and retain
their jobs. He promised UAW legal assistance to any staff member
resisting an investigating committee in other ways. Watkins told
me he had "wanted to take the Fifth" but needed his job. Accepting the UAW directive, he told HUAC all about his own Communist activities, but refused to name others without a court order
directing him to do so. In a landmark opinion by Chief Justice Earl
Warren, the Supreme Court put strict limits on the activities of congressional investigating committees. It is not unlikely that the Wat-
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kins decision saved many a potential witness from subpoena and the
obloquy of "Fifth Amendment Communism."
One final assault on the privilege against self-incriminationcompelling testimony by grant of immunity from prosecution-has
current relevance in the Iran-Contra scandal. As Dean Griswold
pointed out, the Latin maxim for the privilege was, from its inception, "Nemo tenetur prodere se ipsum"-or, in English, "No one
should be required to accuse himself." This lends support to those,
like Justice William 0. Douglas, who argued that the fifth amendment grants a "federally protected right of silence." But that is not
the law. The Supreme Court has in effect reduced the privilege
from not having to accuse oneself in a criminal matter to not having
to give evidence that will help convict oneself.
One would have thought that, at a minimum, if witnesses are
to be compelled to testify and accuse themselves under a grant of
immunity, they would at least receive full immunity from the entire
matter about which they were compelled to testify ("transactional
immunity"). Indeed for a long time nothing less than transactional
immunity was deetned to satisfy the requirements of the fifth
amendment. But in 1970, as part of the Richard Nixon-John
Mitchell war on crime, Congress limited immunity to a bar on the
use of that testimony or evidence derived from it ("use immunity").
No matter that the question whether the prosecutor used tainted
evidence will always be peculiarly within his own knowledge or that
of some staffer. No matter that the potential defendant will almost
certainly disclose his defenses during his compelled testimony,
which will advantage the prosecution in various ways at trial. The
Supreme Court still could find nothing wrong with compelling testimony from a potential defendant with only a limited grant of immunity to protect his fifth amendment privilege.
Some of the pro-fifth amendment civil libertarians of the McCarthy era, rather surprisingly, demanded the compelled testimony
of John Poindexter and Oliver North. One such civil libertarian,
himself a liberal former Supreme Court Justice, proposed that President Reagan order the Secretary of the Navy to bring general
court-martial proceedings against active-duty officers Poindexter
and North, so that compelled testimony under limited use immunity could be expedited. A leading advocate against McCarthyism
argued that "the national interest prevails over a soldier's personal
considerations" so Poindexter and North "have no valid basis other
than personal advantage for invoking their constitutional privilege."
Equally surprising, one of the nation's most respected, long-time
columnists went so far as to suggest a non-immunity "simpler
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way": Just have the President call in Poindexter and North and
"ask them for the facts of what they did and who authorized it."
Independent counsel Lawrence Walsh may have seen the situation most clearly. His earlier requests for delay in the grant of use
immunity to North and Poindexter are easily understood; he
wanted to have his criminal cases buttoned up before immunity became effective. But he went further and argued against the committees giving the leading figures in the investigation any immunity at
all and even directed his staff not to watch the hearings. Quite
likely Walsh sensed the danger that making North and Poindexter
disclose the facts as they know them, including their defenses, may
finally be too much for the courts to swallow. After all, no one
would suggest Walsh could put his case together as he did, and then
haul North and Poindexter before a grand jury under use immunity.
Is it really any different if the committees do it for him? Could the
testimony of North and Poindexter really be totally unknown to
Walsh and his staff today? Will it remain unknown to them during
the trials to come? If the national interest supported requiring
North and Poindexter to testify before the committees, as I believe
it did, then there is a serious question whether the fifth amendment
permits them to be tried thereafter.
The fifth amendment has been the cutting edge of the Bill of
Rights for two centuries. It is our recognition of the dignity of
every human being that he need not accuse or incriminate himself
but rather that the government must prove its case against any accused, high or low. Though it measures the degree of our civilization, the privilege has not always received the support of those who
purport to hold high the banners of freedom. "It seems to me," as
it did to Joseph Welch, that bold spirit of the McCarthy era, "in
this lovely land of ours there is no problem we cannot solve, no
menace we cannot meet, nor is it in any sense necessary that we
either surrender or impair any of our ancient, beautiful freedoms."

